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PPI Partnerships vs. PPI Divorces in LDCs

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Listed author(s):
  • Antonio Estache

    ()

Abstract

In the last 15 years, a variety of public private-partnerships in infrastructure have been adopted throughout the developing and transition world. Because many of these experiences are also turning sour, it seems important to separate facts from emotions. The paper argues that the wide differences in interpretations of the facts can be explained by differences in the assessment criteria used to assess the incremental effect of reforms. It is also driven by the sectors, the regions and the actors on which the analysis tends to focus. Copyright Springer 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-006-9107-7
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Article provided by Springer & The Industrial Organization Society in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 3-26

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Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:3-26
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-006-9107-7
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Keywords: infrastructure privatization; regulation;

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  1. Estache, Antonio & Rossi, Martin A., 2005. "Do regulation and ownership drive the efficiency of electricity distribution? Evidence from Latin America," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 253-257, February.
  2. Antonio Estache & MartÌn A. Rossi, 2002. "How Different Is the Efficiency of Public and Private Water Companies in Asia?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 16(1), pages 139-148, June.
  3. Antonio Estache & Juan Manuel Campos & Nadine Martin & Lourdes Trujillo, 2003. "Macroeconomic Effects of Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44067, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  4. A. Estache & M.E. Pinglo, 2005. "Are returns to private infrastructure in developing countries consistent with risks since the Asian crisis?," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 6(1), pages 47-75, September.
  5. Tim Coelli & Antonio Estache & Sergio Perelman & Lourdes Trujillo, 2003. "A Primer on Efficiency Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulators," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15149, June.
  6. Daniel Benitez & Omar Chisari & Antonio Estache, 2003. "Can the gains from Argentina's utilities reform offset credit shocks?," Chapters,in: Utility Privatization and Regulation, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.
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Cited by:

  1. Tong Fu & Hongzhang Chen & Yongrok Choi, 2016. "Does the Sustainable PPI Investments Promote Financial Market’s Sustainable Development?," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(2), pages 1-18, January.
  2. repec:gam:jsusta:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:120:d:63087 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. de Brux, Julie, 2010. "The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 77-85, June.
  4. Athias, Laure & Saussier, Stéphane, 2007. "Contractual flexibility or rigidity for public private partnerships? Theory and evidence from infrastructure concession contracts," MPRA Paper 10541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Kenny, Charles & Soreide, Tina, 2008. "Grand Corruption in Utilities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4805, The World Bank.
  6. Stéphane Saussier & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2009. "Public–Private Agreements, Institutions, and Competition: When Economic Theory Meets Facts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 1-18, September.
  7. Panayides, Photis M. & Parola, Francesco & Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee, 2015. "The effect of institutional factors on public–private partnership success in ports," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 110-127.
  8. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M., 2013. "A theory of BOT concession contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 187-209.
  9. Athias, Laure, 2007. "Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships," MPRA Paper 10538, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Kikeri, Sunita & Kolo, Aishetu, 2005. "Privatization : trends and recent developments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3765, The World Bank.
  11. Jensen, Olivia & Blanc-Brude, Frederic, 2006. "The handshake : why do governments and firms sign private sector participation deals ? Evidence from the water and sanitation sector in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3937, The World Bank.
  12. Hulya Dagdeviren & Simon A. Robertson, 2009. "Access to Water in the Slums of the Developing World," Working Papers 57, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
  13. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
  14. Jean-Michel Glachant & Stéphane Saussier, 2006. "Introduction," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 29(1), pages 1-2, September.
  15. Marques, Rui Cunha & Berg, Sanford V, 2010. "Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries," MPRA Paper 32890, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008. "The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions," MPRA Paper 10539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  18. Mawhood, Rebecca & Gross, Robert, 2014. "Institutional barriers to a ‘perfect’ policy: A case study of the Senegalese Rural Electrification Plan," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 480-490.

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