IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revaec/v26y2013i4p483-491.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An entrepreneurial critique of Georgism

Author

Listed:
  • Zachary Gochenour
  • Bryan Caplan

Abstract

This paper develops a critique of the single-tax proposal of Henry George. We present a simple search-theoretic model for the discovery of natural resources and show that a tax on the unimproved value of land is distortionary. We then consider the time inconsistency and regime uncertainty problem created by even incremental Georgist policy. We discuss historical cases of land reform and the subsequent challenge to re-establish a credible commitment to property rights in land and natural resources. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Zachary Gochenour & Bryan Caplan, 2013. "An entrepreneurial critique of Georgism," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(4), pages 483-491, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:26:y:2013:i:4:p:483-491
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-013-0218-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11138-013-0218-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11138-013-0218-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stigler, George J., 2011. "Economics of Information," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 35-49.
    2. Fred E. Foldvary, 2005. "Geo-Rent: A Plea to Public Economists," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 2(1), pages 106-132, April.
    3. Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-322, June.
    4. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
    5. Fred E. Foldvary, 2007. "Answering The Questions On Lvt," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 88-89, June.
    6. Fisher, Irving, 1907. "The Rate of Interest," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number fisher1907.
    7. F. H. Knight, 1924. "Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 38(4), pages 582-606.
    8. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226320625 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fred E. Foldvary, 2014. "Governance by voluntary association," Chapters, in: David Emanuel Andersson & Stefano Moroni (ed.), Cities and Private Planning, chapter 4, pages 66-92, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Fred Foldvary, 2014. "Reply to the Caplan and Gochenour critique of Georgism," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(4), pages 451-461, December.
    3. Juan Ramón Rallo, 2019. "Libertarianism and Basic-Income Guarantee: Friends or Foes?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 65-74, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Steven Medema, 2011. "A case of mistaken identity: George Stigler, “The Problem of Social Cost,” and the Coase theorem," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 11-38, February.
    2. Vorotnikova, Ekaterina & Schmitz, Andrew, 2013. "On Positive Externality," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150462, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Caleb S. Fuller, 2019. "Is the market for digital privacy a failure?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 353-381, September.
    4. Jankovic Ivan & Block Walter, 2019. "Private Property Rights, Government Interventionism and Welfare Economics," Review of Economic Perspectives, Sciendo, vol. 19(4), pages 365-397, December.
    5. Kumhof, Michael & Tideman, Nicolaus & Hudson, Michael & Goodhart, Charles, 2021. "Post-Corona Balanced-Budget Super-Stimulus: The Case for Shifting Taxes onto Land," CEPR Discussion Papers 16652, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. P.J. Hammond, 2007. "History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 115(2), pages 161-185.
    7. Jörg Guido Hülsmann, 2006. "The political economy of moral hazard," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(1), pages 35-47.
    8. Fred E. Foldvary, 2014. "Governance by voluntary association," Chapters, in: David Emanuel Andersson & Stefano Moroni (ed.), Cities and Private Planning, chapter 4, pages 66-92, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Brad R. Taylor, 2016. "Exit and the Epistemic Quality of Voice," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 133-144, June.
    10. Adam Martin, 2014. "Where are the big bills? Escaping the endogenizer’s dilemma," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 81-95, March.
    11. Eliasson, Gunnar, 1989. "The Economics of Coordination, Innovation, Selection and Learning: A Theoretical Framework for Research in Industrial Economics," Working Paper Series 235, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    12. Neiss, Katharine S, 1999. "Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 357-374, August.
    13. Furubotn, Eirik G., 2001. "The new institutional economics and the theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 133-153, June.
    14. Christy, Ralph D., 1994. "Private Strategies and Public Policies: The Economics of Information and the Economic Organization of Markets," Staff Papers 121314, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    15. Samuli Leppälä, 2015. "Economic Analysis Of Knowledge: The History Of Thought And The Central Themes," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 263-286, April.
    16. Kärnä, Anders & Karlsson, Johan & Engberg, Erik & Svensson, Peter, 2020. "Political Failure: A Missing Piece in Innovation Policy Analysis," Working Paper Series 1334, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 21 Apr 2022.
    17. Maxime Lambrecht, 2017. "The time limit on copyright: an unlikely tragedy of the intellectual commons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 475-494, June.
    18. James McClure & Tyler Watts, 2016. "The Greatest Externality Story (N)ever Told," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 61(2), pages 157-177, October.
    19. Hideyuki Kamiryo, 2014. "Earth Endogenous System: To Answer the Current Unsolved Economic Problems (Second Edition)," Earth Endogenous System: To Answer the Current Unsolved Economic Problems (Second Edition), Better Advances Press, Canada, edition 2, volume 2, number 01 edited by Dr. Yisheng Huang, May.
    20. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Henry George; Search theory; Property rights; Natural resources; H21; Q15;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:26:y:2013:i:4:p:483-491. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.