Not just guidelines: Pirate codes and the emergence of property rights in The Invisible Hook
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Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- Merrill, Thomas W, 2002. "Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages S331-38, June.
- Mark Roodhouse, 2009. "The invisible hook: the hidden economics of pirates," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(6), pages 973-975.
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