Not just guidelines: Pirate codes and the emergence of property rights in The Invisible Hook
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
Web page: http://www.sdaeonline.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11138/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Merrill, Thomas W, 2002. "Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 331-338, June.
- Mark Roodhouse, 2009. "The invisible hook: the hidden economics of pirates," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(6), pages 973-975.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:23:y:2010:i:3:p:307-313. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.