Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis
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References listed on IDEAS
- Blank, Larry & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 1998. "Dominant Firm Pricing with Competitive Entry and Regulation: The Case of IntraLATA Toll," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 35-53, July.
- T. Beard & George Ford & R. Hill & Richard Saba, 2005. "The flow through of cost changes in competitive telecommunications: Theory and evidence," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 555-573, October.
- Taylor, William E & Zona, J Douglas, 1997. "An Analysis of the State of Competition in Long-Distance Telephone Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 227-255, May.
- Ward, Michael R, 1999. "Product Substitutability and Competition in Long-Distance Telecommunications," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 657-677, October.
More about this item
KeywordsDeregulation; Long-distance telecommunications; Tacit collusion; L1; L5;
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
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