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A Merchant Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion

Author

Listed:
  • Tarjei Kristiansen

    ()

  • Juan Rosellón

    ()

Abstract

We propose a merchant mechanism to expand electricity transmission based on long-term financial transmission rights (FTRs). Due to network loop flows, a change in network capacity might imply negative externalities on existing transmission property rights. The system operator thus needs a protocol for awarding incremental FTRs that maximize investors’ preferences, and preserves certain currently unallocated FTRs (or proxy awards) so as to maintain revenue adequacy. In this paper we define a proxy award as the best use of the current network along the same direction as the incremental awards. We then develop a bi-level programming model for allocation of long-term FTRs according to this rule and apply it to different network topologies. We find that simultaneous feasibility for a transmission expansion project crucially depends on the investor-preference and the proxy-preference parameters. Likewise, for a given amount of pre-existing FTRs the larger the current capacity the greater the need to reserve some FTRs for possible negative externalities generated by the expansion changes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Tarjei Kristiansen & Juan Rosellón, 2006. "A Merchant Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 167-193, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:29:y:2006:i:2:p:167-193
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-6034-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, 1988. "Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electrical Utility Deregulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262600188, January.
    2. Gilbert, Richard & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2002. "Mediating Market Power in Electricity Networks," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt04h2h4hp, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Severin Borenstein & James. Bushnell & Steven Stoft, 2000. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in A Deregulated Electricity Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 294-325, Summer.
    4. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2001. "Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 141-165, September.
    5. Hogan, William W., 2003. "Transmission Market Design," Working Paper Series rwp03-040, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. William Hogan & Juan Rosellón & Ingo Vogelsang, 2010. "Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 113-143, October.
    2. Juan Rosellón & Hannes Weigt, 2011. "A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks: Theory, Modeling, and Application," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 119-148.
    3. Ruiz, Erix & Rosellón, Juan, 2012. "Transmission investment in the Peruvian electricity market: Theory and applications," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 238-245.
    4. Lynch, Muireann Á. & Tol, Richard S.J. & O'Malley, Mark J., 2012. "Optimal interconnection and renewable targets for north-west Europe," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 605-617.
    5. repec:kap:regeco:v:52:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11149-017-9327-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh & Juan Rosellón & Steven A. Gabriel, 2015. "A Profit-Maximizing Approach for Transmission Expansion Planning Using a Revenue-Cap Incentive Mechanism," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1470, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Claudia Kemfert & Friedrich Kunz & Juan Rosellón, 2015. "A Welfare Analysis of the Electricity Transmission Regulatory Regime in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1492, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Cédric Clastres, 2010. "Les réseaux intelligents : régulation, investissement et gestion de la demande électrique," Post-Print halshs-00539818, HAL.
    9. Juan Rosellon & Hannes Weigt, 2007. "A Combined Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion in Europe," Working papers DTE 396, CIDE, División de Economía.
    10. Cédric Clastres & Catherine Locatelli, 2012. "European Union energy security: the challenges of liberalisation in a risk-prone international environment Society," Post-Print halshs-00787123, HAL.
    11. Rosellón, Juan & Myslíková, Zdenka & Zenón, Eric, 2011. "Incentives for transmission investment in the PJM electricity market: FTRs or regulation (or both?)," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-13, January.
    12. Pringles, Rolando & Olsina, Fernando & Garcés, Francisco, 2015. "Real option valuation of power transmission investments by stochastic simulation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 215-226.
    13. Schill, Wolf-Peter & Egerer, Jonas & Rosellón, Juan, 2015. "Testing Regulatory Regimes for Power Transmission Expansion with Fluctuating Demand and Wind Generation," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 1-28.
    14. Zenón, Eric & Rosellón, Juan, 2017. "Optimal transmission planning under the Mexican new electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 349-360.
    15. Bastian Henze & Charles Noussair & Bert Willems, 2012. "Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 1-38, August.
    16. Egerer, Jonas & Rosellón, Juan & Schill, Wolf-Peter, 2015. "Power System Transformation toward Renewables: An Evaluation of Regulatory Approaches for Network Expansion," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 105-128.
    17. Sertaç Oruç & Scott Cunningham, 2014. "Transmission Rights to the Electrical Transmission Grid in the Post Liberalization Era," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 5(4), pages 686-705, December.
    18. Kristiansen, T. & Rosellón, J., 2010. "Merchant electricity transmission expansion: A European case study," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 4107-4115.
    19. Clastres, Cédric, 2011. "Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5399-5408, September.
    20. Rosellon, Juan, 2007. "An incentive mechanism for electricity transmission expansion in Mexico," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 3003-3014, May.
    21. Cédric Clastres, 2011. "Smart grids : Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives," Post-Print halshs-00617702, HAL.
    22. Garcia, Reinaldo C. & Contreras, Javier & Correia, Pedro F. & Muñoz, José I., 2010. "Transmission assets investment timing using net present value curves," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 598-605, January.
    23. Kristiansen, Tarjei, 2008. "Allocation of long-term financial transmission rights for transmission expansion," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(3), pages 1122-1139, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity transmission; Financial transmission rights; Merchant transmission expansion; Bi-level programming; Power flow model; L51; L91; L94; Q40;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General

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