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Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology

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  • Robert Mackay

Abstract

The Brito and Intriligator paper is an ambitious and provocative piece of work. The lack of a satisfactory theoretical model of the interactions between the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the bureaucratic apparatus is one of the major shortcomings of modern political economy. In general, efforts by political theorists to remedy this deficiency should be encouraged. The present authors, in particular, should be encouraged to continue their line of research, refining and further developing their political model, while applying it to other important policy areas. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Mackay, 1981. "Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 61-68, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:1:p:61-68
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124232
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
    2. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    3. Denzau, Arthur T & Mackay, Robert J, 1980. "A Model of Benefit and Tax Share Discrimination by a Monopoly Bureau," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 341-368, June.
    4. Wagner, Richard E & Weber, Warren E, 1975. "Competition, Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 661-684, December.
    5. Denzau, Arthur T. & Mackay, Robert J., 1980. "A model of benefit and tax share discrimination by a monopoly bureau," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 341-368, June.
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