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The electoral lottery: Decisions to run for Congress

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  • Linda Fowler

Abstract

The trend toward electoral security of incumbent members of Congress creates a situation in which challenging an incumbent appears to defy the logic of rational choice. Attitudes toward risk-taking and the rewards of candidacy itself affect a prospective candidate's calculation, and if one regards the decision to run for Congress as a lottery, such behavior can be brought within the framework of rational decision-making. The electoral lottery is operationalized according to incumbency status and the ratio of party strength in each district. Systematic differences in the recruitment of challengers are associated with the lottery types on a variety of dimensions. Data drawn from preelection interviews with forty-three nonincumbent Congressional candidates during 1974 confirm the usefulness of the model. The major finding of the study is that only candidates with a low value for the certain option, who in effect have ‘nothing to lose’, will gamble against an incumbent. Such candidates, however, lack the political resources necessary for success, so that the incumbent rarely faces a serious challenge. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers b.v. 1979

Suggested Citation

  • Linda Fowler, 1979. "The electoral lottery: Decisions to run for Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 399-418, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:34:y:1979:i:3:p:399-418
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00225677
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