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Mixed electoral systems: an introduction to the special issue

Author

Listed:
  • Jarosław Flis

    (Jagiellonian University)

  • Bernard Grofman

    (University of California)

  • Marek M. Kaminski

    (University of California)

Abstract

Mixed electoral systems, also known as mixed-member systems, combine two common types of electoral systems: majoritarian single-member district (SMD) and proportional representation (PR), aiming to blend their strengths. In these systems, majoritarian rules allocate a portion of seats, while another portion is assigned by PR in multiple-member districts (MMD). Characterized by dual electoral structures, similar numbers of seats in both tiers, nationwide application, and equal MP status, these systems seek to balance competing normative advantages but vary significantly based on vote and seat linkage mechanisms. Initially hailed as a potential “best of both worlds” solution, as seen in Germany’s 1949 system and adopted by about 30 countries by 2025, mixed systems have revealed complex challenges and unintended consequences. While issues differ across contexts, comparative analysis of these systems highlights that careful design, informed by global experiences, can mitigate pitfalls, emphasizing the value of learning from successes and failures in electoral reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Jarosław Flis & Bernard Grofman & Marek M. Kaminski, 2025. "Mixed electoral systems: an introduction to the special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 204(1), pages 1-14, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:204:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-025-01311-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01311-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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