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Moral community and moral order: Buchanan’s theory of obligation

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  • Michael Munger

    (Duke University)

Abstract

In 1981, James Buchanan published the text of a lecture entitled “Moral Community, Moral Order, and Moral Anarchy.” The argument in that paper deserves more attention than it has received in the literature, as it closely follows the argument made by Adam Smith in Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith believed, and rightly, that moral communities—to use Buchanan’s words—are indispensable. Smith also believed that the system could be expanded to encompass norms that foster commercial society. Buchanan allows for the same possibility in his discussion of moral community, in some ways similar to Hayek’s “great society” norms. But Buchanan points out the dark possibility that moral orders can collapse, relegating interactions outside of small moral communities to moral anarchy. Buchanan’s contribution is an important, and unrecognized, link between Smith’s conception of propriety and Hume’s conception of convention.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Munger, 2020. "Moral community and moral order: Buchanan’s theory of obligation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 509-521, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00791-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00791-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "James M. Buchanan centennial birthday academic conference: an introduction to the special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 223-226, June.
    2. Paul Lewis & John Meadowcroft, 2024. "Constitutional artisans: James Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom on artifactual man, the constitutional attitude, and the political economy of constitutional design," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 363-387, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Division of labor; History of economic thought; Political economy; Property rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B1 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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