Fiscal and Spending Behavior of Local Governments: Identification of Price Effects When Prices Are Not Observed
This paper analyzes local public fiscal and spending behavior in a setting where local governments, represented by the dominant party or coalition, are treated as utility maximizing agents. The econometric analysis, which is based on a modified version of ELES, recognizes total spending as well as total income as endogenous variables. Identification of the price effects is achieved by utilizing data on environmental cost factors and local tastes. The performance of the estimated model is investigated by testing its ability to make out-of-sample predictions of local government behavior. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:117:y:2003:i:1-2:p:125-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.