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The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics

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  • Matt Grossmann

Abstract

Theories of interest group mobilization are central to political science but current research on interest organizations has not proven useful for scholars in related fields. I argue that, by adapting organizational theory to account for the particular function of interest organizations, scholars can build a widely applied theoretical framework. The key step is an analysis of the role that organizations play in the mobilization of influence: they are intermediaries, reliant on their constituents and their lobbying targets. Reviewing research on ethnic politics and political economy, I demonstrate that this intermediary view of interest organizations encourages theoretical ideas to travel between subfields. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Matt Grossmann, 2006. "The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 107-124, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:6:y:2006:i:2:p:107-124
    DOI: 10.1007/s11115-006-0002-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alvarez, R. Michael & Garrett, Geoffrey & Lange, Peter, 1991. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 539-556, June.
    2. Salisbury, Robert H., 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 64-76, March.
    3. Tsebelis, George, 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 591-608, September.
    4. Shingles, Richard D., 1981. "Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 76-91, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sami Ullah & Dr. Abu Rashid Jafri & Muhammad Khyzer Bin Dost, 2011. "A synthesis of literature on organizational politics," Far East Journal of Psychology and Business, Far East Research Centre, vol. 3(3), pages 36-49, June.
    2. Mahmood A Bodla, 2013. "The Use of Influence Tactics in Politicized Organizations: A Look from Gender Perspective," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 5(9), pages 456-462.

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