DEA and Dynamic Yardstick Competition in Scandinavian Electricity Distribution
Multi-period multi-product regulatory schemes for electricity distributors are presented, based on cost information from a productivity analysis model and an agency theoretical decision model. The proposed schemes are operational and demonstrate considerable advantages compared to the popular CPI-X revenue cap regulation. The schemes avoid arbitrariness, excessively high or negative informational rents as well as ratchet effects and they promote rapid productivity catch-up by making full use of available data. More generally, the paper contributes to the theoretical unification between firm-based Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) productivity models and micro-economic reimbursement theories. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
Volume (Year): 23 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- Kittelsen, S.A.C., 1993. "Stepwise DEA; Choosing Variables for Measuring Technical Efficiency in Norwegian Electricity Distribution," Memorandum 06/1993, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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