Comments on Switgard Feuerstein's “Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey”
These comments elaborate on the policy implications of theoretical models and compare them with competition law and practice. In regard to EU merger control it is discussed how case law has dealt with the creation of market structures that would maintain collusion. With respect to leniency programmes the deterrence and desistment incentives of actually implemented programmes are compared with theoretical results. Certain areas of research of particular relevance for enforcement are indicated in the conclusions. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Klemperer, 2004.
"Auctions: Theory and Practice,"
Economics Series Working Papers
2004-W09, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- John M. Connor, 2004.
"Global Antitrust Prosecutions Of Modern International Cartels,"
04-15, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- John M. Connor, 2004. "Global Antitrust Prosecutions of Modern International Cartels," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 239-267, 09.
- Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
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