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Applying the Theory of Small Economies and Competition Policy: The Case of Switzerland

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  • Samuel Rutz

Abstract

The question whether optimal competition policy depends on the size of an economy has recently received considerable attention. In particular it has been argued that markets in small economies are often highly concentrated and protected by substantial entry barriers. Market forces may therefore not be strong enough to correct inefficient economic behaviour, i.e. inefficiencies may endure in small economies. This paper applies the theory of small economies and competition policy to the case of Switzerland. It finds that Switzerland cannot be rated as the prototype of a small economy as pertaining to competition policy. It further assesses whether the Swiss Cartel Act accounts for the potential efficiency problems of small economies and reveals that there is scope for a more efficiency enhancing legal competition framework within Switzerland. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Rutz, 2013. "Applying the Theory of Small Economies and Competition Policy: The Case of Switzerland," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 255-272, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:13:y:2013:i:2:p:255-272
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-011-0113-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lewis Evans, 2004. "The efficiency test under competition law and regulation in the small distant open economy that is New Zealand," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(2), pages 241-264.
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    6. Lewis Evans & Patrick Hughes, 2003. "Competition Policy in Small Distant Open Economies: Some Lessons from the Economics Literature," Treasury Working Paper Series 03/31, New Zealand Treasury.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust; small economies; Swiss competition law; law enforcement; K21; K42; L4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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