IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jeczfn/v96y2009i2p169-188.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model

Author

Listed:
  • Siu-kee Wong

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Siu-kee Wong, 2009. "Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 169-188, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:96:y:2009:i:2:p:169-188
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-008-0035-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-008-0035-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00712-008-0035-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jones, Ronald W, 1969. "Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 418-424, June.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-795, September.
    3. W. M. Gorman, 1958. "Tariffs, Retaliation, and the Elasticity of Demand for Imports," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 25(3), pages 133-162.
    4. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wong, Siu-kee, 2004. "Existence of trading Nash equilibrium in tariff retaliation models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 367-387, May.
    2. Opp, Marcus M., 2010. "Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 212-225, March.
    3. Carsten Kowalczyk & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Trade Agreements," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Daniel Bernhofen & Rod Falvey & David Greenaway & Udo Kreickemeier (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of International Trade, chapter 13, pages 367-388, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Hideo Konishi & Carsten Kowalczyk & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Free Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 568, Boston College Department of Economics.
    5. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
    6. Cox, W. Michael & Ruffin, Roy J., 1998. "Country-bashing tariffs: Do bilateral trade deficits matter?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 61-72, October.
    7. He, Chuantian & Li, Chunding & Wang, Jing & Whalley, John, 2017. "The Armington assumption and the size of optimal tariffs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 214-222.
    8. Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 2000. "GATT-think," Working papers 19, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    9. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    10. Chunding Li & John Whalley & Chuantian He & Chuangwei Lin, 2021. "The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Lack of Retaliatory Trade Intervention," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 67(1), pages 78-105.
    11. Susanna Thede, 2005. "Determinants of Bilateral Trade Protection," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 313-328, March.
    12. Mohammad Amin, 2004. "Time Inconsistency of Trade Policy and Multilateralism," International Trade 0402002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Zissimos, Ben, 2009. "Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 276-286, July.
    14. Chisik, Richard, 2003. "Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 367-397, March.
    15. Benjamin Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, 2015. "World Trade Organization sanctions, implementation, and retaliation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 715-745, March.
    16. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2008. "Safeguards and Retaliatory Threats," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 351-376, May.
    17. Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
    18. Chunding Li, 2017. "How Would Bilateral Trade Retaliation Affect China?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 459-479, March.
    19. Hajime Takatsuka & Dao‐Zhi Zeng, 2022. "Mobile capital, optimal tariff, and tariff war," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 166-204, February.
    20. James D. Gaisford & William A. Kerr, 1992. "Which Country Loses The Least In A Trade War?," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 36(3), pages 249-274, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tariff retaliation; Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium; Comparative statics; F11; F13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:96:y:2009:i:2:p:169-188. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.