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Emergence of populism under ambiguity

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  • Daiki Kishishita

    (The University of Tokyo)

Abstract

The aim of this article is to provide a short summary of the study that obtained the ITAX Ph.D. Award in 2017 (Kishishita, in: Emergence of populism under risk and ambiguity, 2017. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006550 ). This study is a game-theoretic analysis of populism using a dynamic elections model with information asymmetries. The main focus is the effect of uncertainty voters face about an elite’s degree of bias on the emergence of populism. Interestingly, its effect is different depending on the source of the uncertainty. In particular, an increase in risk and that in ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) work in the opposite directions with higher ambiguity rather than risk being a significant source of populism.

Suggested Citation

  • Daiki Kishishita, 2018. "Emergence of populism under ambiguity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(6), pages 1559-1562, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:6:d:10.1007_s10797-018-9519-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-018-9519-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "A Political Theory of Populism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(2), pages 771-805.
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    6. ,, 2016. "Condorcet meets Ellsberg," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giray Gozgor, 2020. "The Role of Economic Uncertainty in Rising Populism in the EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 8499, CESifo.
    2. Giray Gozgor, 2022. "The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 229-246, January.
    3. Kishishita, Daiki, 2020. "(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Populism; Dynamic electrons; Political agency; Ambiguity; Risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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