A model to decompose the performance of supplementary private health insurance markets
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References listed on IDEAS
- Newhouse, Joseph P., 1982. "Is competition the answer?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 109-116, May.
- Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643 Elsevier.
- Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-427, Autumn.
- Reiner Leidl, 2003.
"Medical Progress and Supplementary Private Health Insurance,"
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance,
The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, vol. 28, pages 222-237, April.
- Reiner Leidl, 2003. "Medical Progress and Supplementary Private Health Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 28(2), pages 222-237, April.
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- repec:aph:ajpbhl:2000:90:6:924-928_4 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pauly, Mark V., 1984. "Is cream-skimming a problem for the competitive medical market?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 87-95, April.
More about this item
KeywordsAdverse selection; Cream skimming; Moral hazard; Private health insurance; D82; G22; I10;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
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