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Incentive effects of class actions and punitive damages under alternative procedural regimes

Author

Listed:
  • Marta Cenini
  • Barbara Luppi
  • Francesco Parisi

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Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Cenini & Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2011. "Incentive effects of class actions and punitive damages under alternative procedural regimes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 229-240, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:229-240
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9241-z
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-011-9241-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Cassone & Giovanni Ramello, 2011. "The simple economics of class action: private provision of club and public goods," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 205-224, October.
    2. Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011. "Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 241-262, October.
    3. Craswell, Richard, 1996. "Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 463-492, June.
    4. Epstein, Richard, 2003. "Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt414773mr, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Juergen Backhaus & Alberto Cassone & Giovanni Ramello, 2011. "The law and economics of class actions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 165-168, October.
    2. Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, 2011. "Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a comparison," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 293-304, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Punitive damages; Class actions; Loser-Pays rule; Incentives; K13; K4;

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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