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The economic constitution of the European community: From Rome to Maastricht

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  • Manfred Streit
  • Werner Mussler

Abstract

The present paper analyzes the changes in the economic constitution of the European Community since its foundation in 1958. In order to identify the various changes, we start by developing a frame of reference. Our proposition is that theconstitutional charter of the European Economic Community (EEC)—the EEC Treaty—came closest to this frame of reference, being an economic constitution for a market system, whereas the subsequentprocess of European integration—including several modifications of the Treaty—was largely based on the introduction of non-market elements. Our argument is that as far as the economic constitution is concerned, the Treaty of Maastricht is dominated by traits which are characteristic of modern welfare states. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred Streit & Werner Mussler, 1994. "The economic constitution of the European community: From Rome to Maastricht," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 319-353, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:3:p:319-353
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393264
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    1. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
    2. von Hayek, Friedrich August, 1989. "The Pretence of Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(6), pages 3-7, December.
    3. Basedow, Jürgen, 1992. "Von der deutschen zur europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung," Beiträge zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 127, number urn:isbn:9783161459603, December.
    4. Klodt, Henning & Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Maurer, Rainer & Neu, Axel Dietmar & Soltwedel, Rüdiger & Stehn, Jürgen, 1992. "Die Strukturpolitik der EG," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 757, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Starbatty, Joachim, 1993. "Europäische Industriepolitik und die Folgen: Zur Immanenz industriepolitischer Dynamik," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 28, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. JEAN-MICHEL Josselin & ALAIN Marciano, 1997. "The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-22, January.
    2. Carbonara Emanuela & Luppi Barbara & Parisi Francesco, 2009. "Self-Defeating Subsidiarity," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 741-783, December.
    3. Christian Kirchner, 1997. "Competence Catalogues and the Principle of Subsidiarity in a European Constitution," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 71-87, March.
    4. Wohlgemuth Michael, 1995. "Institutional Competition. Notes on an Unfinished Agenda," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 277-300, June.
    5. Streit, Manfred E. & Voigt, Stefan, 1996. "Toward ever closer union--or ever larger? Or both? Entry to the European Union from the perspective of constitutional economics," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 385-388, September.
    6. Michael C. Munger, 2022. "Giants among us: do we need a new antitrust paradigm?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 445-460, December.
    7. Starbatty, Joachim, 1998. "Politik oder Markt als Wegbereiter der Integration Europas," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 131, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    8. Streit Manfred E., 1998. "Competition Among Systems, Harmonisation and Integration," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2-3), pages 239-254, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    F02; L52; N44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-

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