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Local Economic Performance and Election Outcomes

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  • David Mitchell
  • Keith Willett

Abstract

This paper uses a logit model to test whether voters will alter their support for incumbents in state level elections, specifically gubernatorial and state house and senate elections, when local (i.e., county) economic conditions are observed. The results signify that voters do hold the incumbent party responsible for economic conditions. Furthermore, voters tend to place more emphasis on unemployment levels than on real personal income indicating that incumbent politicians might want to engage in policies that put people to work rather than on policies that raise income. The results also suggest that voters did not hold their state house and senate representative as responsible for local economic conditions as they did the governor. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • David Mitchell & Keith Willett, 2006. "Local Economic Performance and Election Outcomes," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(2), pages 219-232, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:34:y:2006:i:2:p:219-232
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-006-9008-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Tannenwald & Jennifer Weiner & Igor Popov, 2010. "Genesis of State–Local Creativity," Chapters, in: Sally Wallace (ed.), State and Local Fiscal Policy, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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