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Why Economic Education Is Dangerous for Politicians

Author

Listed:
  • Mark C. Schug

    (University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee)

  • Dwight R. Lee

    (University of Georgia and Ball State University)

Abstract

This paper explores reasons why pre-college economic education is not more widespread. Although survey data suggest that adults think that economics is important in the pre-college curriculum, the study of economics tends to be delayed until the last possible moment in schooling, if it is included at all. We argue that if voters took seriously such basic economic concepts as scarcity, opportunity cost, and incentives and applied them to public issues, it would make life more difficult for politicians who prefer a world in which people think they can get something for nothing. The paper analyzes aspects of public choice theory to help explain why politicians are adverse to widespread economic education. We conclude with thoughts regarding how things could be different.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark C. Schug & Dwight R. Lee, 2012. "Why Economic Education Is Dangerous for Politicians," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 28(1), pages 47-60.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:985
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
    2. Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2005. "Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 79-105.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sean Alley & Mark Melichar, 2021. "Examining the Impact of Economics Education on Young Americans’ Attitudes about the Economy and Economic Institutions," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 36(4), pages 21-44.

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