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Motivation, Human Capital Investment and Compensation in an Agency Problem

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  • Anthony M. Marino

Abstract

This paper considers a firm's optimal investment in training and motivation measures in a hidden action agency problem. We study how these strategies interact with each other and the contract in order to create value for the firm. Productivity enhancing training can be firm specific or non-firm specific and firm specific motivation can enhance utility or reduce effort cost. Whether these measures are complements or independents depends on the firm specificity of human capital and whether the participation constraint is binding. We characterize how a tighter labor market affects marginal profitabilities and examine the relative benefits of motivation measures which enhance utility versus those which decrease effort cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony M. Marino, 2019. "Motivation, Human Capital Investment and Compensation in an Agency Problem," Journal of Management and Strategy, Journal of Management and Strategy, Sciedu Press, vol. 10(4), pages 37-58, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:jfr:jms111:v:10:y:2019:i:4:p:37-58
    DOI: 10.5430/jms.v10n4p37
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    References listed on IDEAS

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