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An Agent-Based Model of the Interaction Between Inequality, Trust, and Communication in Common Pool Experiments

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Abstract

An agent-based model is presented that aims to capture the involvement of inequality and trust in collective action in a classic commons dilemma before, during, and after communication. The model assumptions are based on the behavioral theory of collective action of Elinor Ostrom and the ‘humanistic rational choice theory’. The commons dilemma is represented as a spatially explicit renewable resource. Agent’s trust in others has an impact on the harvesting of shared resources, and trust is influenced by observed harvesting behavior and cheap talk. We calibrated the model using data from a prior set of lab experiments on inequality, trust, and communication. The best fit to the data consists of a population with a small share of altruistic and selfish agents and a majority of conditional cooperative agents sensitive to inequality and who would cooperate if others did. Communication increased trust explaining the better group performance when communication was introduced. The modeling results complement prior communication research and clarify the dynamics of reciprocal cooperation commonly observed in robust resource governance systems.

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  • Marco A. Janssen & Daniel DeCaro & Allen Lee, 2022. "An Agent-Based Model of the Interaction Between Inequality, Trust, and Communication in Common Pool Experiments," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 25(4), pages 1-3.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2022-33-3
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    1. Anderies, John M. & Janssen, Marco A. & Bousquet, François & Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Castillo, Daniel & Lopez, Maria-Claudio & Tobias, Robert & Vollan, Björn & Wutich, Amber, 2011. "The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1571-1579, July.
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    1. Lang, Dengxiao & Ertsen, Maurits W., 2023. "Modelling farmland dynamics in response to farmer decisions using an advanced irrigation-related agent-based model," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 486(C).

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