Mathematical modeling of common-pool resources: A comprehensive review of bioeconomics, strategic interaction, and complex adaptive systems

The governance of common-pool resources—resource systems characterized by high subtractability of yield and difficulty of exclusion—constitutes one of the most persistent and intricate challenges in the fields of economics, ecology, and applied mathematics. This structured review delineates the historical and theoretical evolution of the mathematical frameworks developed to analyze, predict, and manage these systems. We trace the intellectual trajectory from the early, deterministic bioeconomic models of the mid-20th century, which established the fundamental tension between individual profit maximization and collective efficiency, to the contemporary era of complex coupled human-environment system models. Our analysis methodically dissects the formalization of the “Tragedy of the Commons” through the lens of classical cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, examining how the N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium concepts provided the initial, albeit pessimistic, predictive baseline. We subsequently explore the “Ostrom Turn”, which necessitated the integration of institutional realism—specifically monitoring, graduated sanctions, and communication—into formal game-theoretic structures. The review further investigates the relaxation of rationality assumptions via evolutionary game theory and behavioral economics, highlighting the destabilizing roles of prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting. Finally, we synthesize recent advances in stochastic differential equations and agent-based computational economics, which capture the critical roles of spatial heterogeneity, noise-induced regime shifts, and early warning signals of collapse. By unifying these diverse mathematical threads, this review elucidates the shifting paradigm from static optimization to dynamic resilience in the management of the commons.