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Egalitarian Sharing Explains Food Distributions in a Small-Scale Society

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  • Marcos Pinheiro

Abstract

Among social anthropologists, there is virtual consensus that the food-sharing practices of small-scale non-agricultural groups cannot be understood in isolation from the broader repertoire of leveling strategies that prevent would-be dominants from exercising power and influence over likely subordinates. In spite of that widespread view, quantitatively rigorous empirical studies of food sharing and cooperation in small-scale human groups have typically ignored the internal connection between leveling of income and political power, drawing inspiration instead from evolutionary models that are neutral about social role asymmetries. In this paper, I introduce a spatially explicit agent-based model of hunter-gatherer food sharing in which individuals are driven by the goal of maximizing their own income while minimizing income asymmetries among others. Model simulation results show that seven basic patterns of inter-household food transfers described in detail for the Hadza hunters of Tanzania can be simultaneously reproduced with striking accuracy under the assumption that agents selectively support and carry on sharing interactions in ways that maximize their income leveling potential.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcos Pinheiro, 2022. "Egalitarian Sharing Explains Food Distributions in a Small-Scale Society," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 25(3), pages 1-5.
  • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2020-155-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Paul L. Hooper & Hillard S. Kaplan & Adrian V. Jaeggi, 2021. "Gains to cooperation drive the evolution of egalitarianism," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 5(7), pages 847-856, July.
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