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Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on the Second-Best Decision

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    In the research addressing the prisoner's dilemma game, the effectiveness and accountableness of the method allowing for the emergence of cooperation is generally discussed. The most well-known solutions for this question are memory based iteration, the tag used to distinguish between defector and cooperator, the spatial structure of the game and the either direct or indirect reciprocity. We have also challenged to approach the topic from a different point of view namely that temperate acquisitiveness in decision making could be possible to achieve cooperation. It was already shown in our previous research that the exclusion of the best decision had a remarkable effect on the emergence of an almost cooperative state. In this paper, we advance the decision of our former research to become more explainable by introducing the second-best decision. If that decision is adopted, players also reach an extremely high level cooperative state in the prisoner's dilemma game and also in that of extended strategy expression. The cooperation of this extended game is facilitated only if the product of two parameters is under the criticality. In addition, the applicability of our model to the problem in the real world is discussed.

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    File URL: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/12/4/7/7.pdf
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    Article provided by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in its journal Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 1-7

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    Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2008-7-4
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    1. Saijo, T. & Une, M. & Yamaguchi, T., 1994. "'Dango' Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 0351, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
    3. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    4. Hugo Fort, 2003. "Cooperation with Random Interactions and Without Memory or "tags"," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 6(2), pages 1-4.
    5. E. Ahmed & A. S. Hegazi & A. S. Elgazzar, 2002. "On Spatial Asymmetric Games," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(04), pages 433-443.
    6. Fort, H. & Sicardi, E., 2007. "Evolutionary Markovian strategies in 2×2 spatial games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 375(1), pages 323-335.
    7. Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Fudenberg, Drew & Taylor, Christine, 2004. "Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
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