IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/isp/journl/v16y2022i1p293-305.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Conflict Analysis Tools In Situations Related To Nash'S Bargaining Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Radim Valenčík
  • Benedikt Frank
  • Bastian Schulz

Abstract

The paper is based on the interpretation of the causes of differences between the assumed and empirically observed decision-making of players in the ultimate game. It follows the identification and definition of the phenomenon of positional investing, which allows to transform a property or income advantage into an improvement of the position of one of the players. An important step in describing the dilemmas arising in conditions where positional investing occurs is to define the function (in the simplified case, the line) of positional neutrality. To do this, it is necessary to extend the assumptions of Nash's bargaining problem. One of the most important applications is in the area of reforms aimed at more fully exploiting opportunities to develop, preserve and apply human capabilities according to their rate of return.

Suggested Citation

  • Radim Valenčík & Benedikt Frank & Bastian Schulz, 2022. "Conflict Analysis Tools In Situations Related To Nash'S Bargaining Problem," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 16(1), pages 293-305.
    • Handle: RePEc:isp:journl:v:16:y:2022:i:1:p:293-305
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.scientific-publications.net/get/1000055/1665227638202151.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    2. Loomes, Graham, 1999. "Some Lessons from Past Experiments and Some Challenges for the Future," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 35-45, February.
    3. William Thomson (ed.), 2010. "Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13317.
    4. Binmore, Ken, 2007. "Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300574.
    5. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Petr Mach & Jan Pokorný & Radim Valenčík, 2023. "Analysis Tools Of Positional Investments And The Ultimatum Game," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 17(1), pages 166-180.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Radim Valenčík & Ondřej Černík, 2021. "The Inequality In Society And A Multipoint Extension Of Nash Bargaining Problem," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 15(1), pages 221-232.
    2. Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 318-343, July.
    3. Petr Mach & Jan Pokorný & Radim Valenčík, 2023. "Analysis Tools Of Positional Investments And The Ultimatum Game," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 17(1), pages 166-180.
    4. Alexander Lenger & Stephan Wolf & Nils Goldschmidt, 2021. "Choosing inequality: how economic security fosters competitive regimes," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 19(2), pages 315-346, June.
    5. Manfred J. Holler & Martin A. Leroch, 2014. "Theories of justice and empirical results," Chapters, in: Francesco Forte & Ram Mudambi & Pietro Maria Navarra (ed.), A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 6, pages 143-159, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Jose Alejandro Coronado, 2018. "An Information-Constrained Model for Ultimatum Bargaining," Working Papers 1815, New School for Social Research, Department of Economics.
    7. Alexandre Bevilacqua Leoneti & René Bañares-Alcántara & Eduardo Cleto Pires & Sonia Valle Walter Borges Oliveira, 2022. "A Multi-Criteria and Multi-Agent Framework for supporting complex decision-making processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(5), pages 1025-1050, October.
    8. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    9. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    10. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 245-278, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    11. Fredrik Carlsson & Dinky Daruvala & Olof Johansson‐Stenman, 2005. "Are People Inequality‐Averse, or Just Risk‐Averse?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(287), pages 375-396, August.
    12. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
    13. Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
    14. Omer F. Baris, 2018. "Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 547-556, June.
    15. Ronaldo Fiani, 2004. "An Evaluation of the Role of the State and Property Rights in Douglass North’s Analysis," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(4), pages 1003-1020, December.
    16. Ian Gregory‐Smith, 2021. "Wages And Labor Productivity: Evidence From Injuries In The National Football League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(2), pages 829-847, April.
    17. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf & Grubiak, Kevin & Werner, Katharina, 2023. "Intrinsic Motivation vs. Corruption? Experimental Evidence on the Performance of Officials," MPRA Paper 118153, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Nataliya Kusa, 2018. "Should intra-familial time transfers be compensated financially?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201802, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    19. Jingyi Xue, 2018. "Fair division with uncertain needs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 105-136, June.
    20. Berentsen, Aleksander & McBride, Michael & Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2017. "Limelight on dark markets: Theory and experimental evidence on liquidity and information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 70-90.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    nash bargaining problem; game theory; ultimatum game; positional investment neutrality function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A - General Economics and Teaching

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isp:journl:v:16:y:2022:i:1:p:293-305. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Svetoslav Ivanov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.scientific-publications.net/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.