Fundamentos para una Reforma Tributaria en Chile
Chile mainly taxes consumption. In fact, indirect taxes collect about 75% of total revenue, and the income tax, which collects the remaining 25%, incorporates schemes that allow taxpayers to substract from their tax duties part of the flow of savings, app
Volume (Year): 37 (2000)
Issue (Month): 111 ()
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pablo Serra, 2000.
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77, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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41, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Engel, Eduardo M. R. A. & Galetovic, Alexander & Raddatz, Claudio E., 1999. "Taxes and income distribution in Chile: some unpleasant redistributive arithmetic," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 155-192, June.
- Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Alexander Galetovic & Claudio E. Raddatz, 1998. "Taxes and Income Distribution in Chile: Some Unpleasant Redistributive Arithmetic," NBER Working Papers 6828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Jorratt & Pablo Serra, 2000. "Estimación de la evasión en el impuesto a las empresas en Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 72, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Alm, James, 1996. "What Is an "Optimal'"Tax System?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 49(1), pages 117-33, March.
- Pablo Serra, 1998. "Evaluación del Sistema Tributario Chileno y Propuesta de Reforma," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 40, Central Bank of Chile.
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- William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1996.
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NBER Working Papers
5832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1997. "Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 11, pages 1-48 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1996. "The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(1), pages 172-198, March.
- Timothy Besley & Ian Preston & Michael Ridge, .
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96-02, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- Besley, Timothy & Preston, Ian & Ridge, Michael, 1997. "Fiscal anarchy in the UK: Modelling poll tax noncompliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 137-152, May.
- Timothy Besley & Ian Preston & Michael Ridge, 1993. "Fiscal Anarchy in the U.K.: Modelling Poll Tax Noncompliance," NBER Working Papers 4498, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Engen, Eric M. & Gravelle, Jane G. & Smetters, Kent, 1997. "Dynamic Tax Models: Why They Do the Things They Do," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 50(3), pages 657-82, September.
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