Unanimity and Compromise Among Probability Forecasters
When two forecasters agree regarding the probability of an uncertain event, should a decision maker adopt that probability as his or her own? A decision maker who does so is said to act in accord with the unanimity principle. We examine a variety of Bayesian consensus models with respect to their conformance (or lack thereof) to the unanimity principle and a more general compromise principle. In an analysis of a large set of probability forecast data from meteorology, we show how well the various models, when fit to the data, reflect the empirical pattern of conformance to these principles.
Volume (Year): 36 (1990)
Issue (Month): 7 (July)
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