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Quantitative Methods for a New Configuration of Territorial Units in a Chilean Government Agency Tender Process

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  • Guillermo Durán

    (Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, FCFM, Universidad de Chile, 8370439 Santiago, Chile; Departamento de Matemática, FCEN, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina; CONICET, Argentina)

  • Rafael Epstein

    (Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, FCFM, Universidad de Chile, 8370439 Santiago, Chile)

  • Cristian Martinez

    (Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, FCFM, Universidad de Chile, 8370439 Santiago, Chile)

  • Gonzalo Andres Zamorano

    (Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, FCFM, Universidad de Chile, 8370439 Santiago, Chile)

Abstract

The Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas (JUNAEB) is an agency of the Chilean government with responsibility for promoting the integration and retention of socially vulnerable children in the country's school system. Its services include a school meals program under which private firms bid on supply contracts for territorial units within Chile. Before 2007, these units were defined manually and their attractiveness to potential suppliers varied. This led to a series of problems for the government, both in the contract tender process and the service provided. In this paper, we apply operations research methodologies to determine new configurations of the territorial units to ensure that their attractiveness is similar and that schools in each region of the country receive meal service of similar, good quality. This homogenization of the units' attractiveness helps reduce the uncertainty and bankruptcy risk that suppliers face, thus benefitting the entire system. Since 2007, JUNAEB has used the configurations we proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillermo Durán & Rafael Epstein & Cristian Martinez & Gonzalo Andres Zamorano, 2011. "Quantitative Methods for a New Configuration of Territorial Units in a Chilean Government Agency Tender Process," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 41(3), pages 263-277, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orinte:v:41:y:2011:i:3:p:263-277
    DOI: 10.1287/inte.1100.0537
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. F. Bonomo & J. Catalán & G. Durán & R. Epstein & M. Guajardo & A. Jawtuschenko & J. Marenco, 2017. "An asymmetric multi-item auction with quantity discounts applied to Internet service procurement in Buenos Aires public schools," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 258(2), pages 569-585, November.

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