Constant Best-Response Functions: Interpreting Cournot
Following Amir and Grilo (1999), we characterize a class of demand functions that generate constant quantity best-response functions. We examine implications of constant best-response functions for the invariance of equilibrium outcomes with respect to the assumed market structure of quantity games. We argue that, unlike the class of linear demand functions, this class of demand functions supports the pure interpretation of Cournot conjectures.
Volume (Year): 8 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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