IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/igg/jhcitp/v15y2024i1p1-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does the Concept of Property Rights Hold Relevance for Human Resource Performance?: An Applied Study of Privatized Companies in Tunisia

Author

Listed:
  • Fakhri Issaoui

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

  • Zaher Meshari Abderrahim

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

  • Majed Bin Othayman

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

  • Slah Slimani

    (King Khalid University, Saudi Arabia)

Abstract

In a world where information technologies (ITs) are globalizing and acting directly and explicitly on organizations, the question of property rights neutrality becomes strategic. In this study, the authors investigated whether ownership is a determinant of human resource performance or whether it is driven by factors other than ownership (e.g., technology and IT). Thus, the major objective of this research was to find out under what conditions ownership exerts a nonneutral effect on the performance of human resources and whether these effects are dependent on the technological aspects of organizations. The authors' methodology included two techniques, namely, nonparametric tests applied to the main indicators of 21 privatized companies (operating in the IT and other sectors) in the Tunisian case, and panel data to explain the impact of privatizations on human resources. The results showed that the privatization process has allowed an improvement in productivity indicators through an increase in incentive systems, particularly for companies with high technological content. The application of the econometric technique evidenced a whole policy of restructuring the allocation of human resources, in the postprivatization period. This makes sense because the incentive system of newly privatized companies strived to be more efficient. Furthermore, the second model showed that human resource dynamics after privatization depends on the business cycle and the nature of investors and IT. The third model confirmed the idea that privatization leads to an improvement in the workforce and its productivity in the long term. Overall, the study generated important managerial implications, the most important of which is that privatization can only generate a positive effect on human resource performance when employees feel involved in the process and as much as the organization is involved in new ITs.

Suggested Citation

  • Fakhri Issaoui & Zaher Meshari Abderrahim & Majed Bin Othayman & Slah Slimani, 2024. "Does the Concept of Property Rights Hold Relevance for Human Resource Performance?: An Applied Study of Privatized Companies in Tunisia," International Journal of Human Capital and Information Technology Professionals (IJHCITP), IGI Global Scientific Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 1-25, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:igg:jhcitp:v:15:y:2024:i:1:p:1-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://services.igi-global.com/resolvedoi/resolve.aspx?doi=10.4018/IJHCITP.342088
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    3. Lena Brogaard & Ole Helby Petersen, 2022. "Privatization of Public Services: A Systematic Review of Quality Differences between Public and Private Daycare Providers," International Journal of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(10), pages 794-806, July.
    4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and environmental innovation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Aalbers, Rob & Shestalova, Victoria & Kocsis, Viktória, 2013. "Innovation policy for directing technical change in the power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1240-1250.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and compliance strategies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 85-125, October.
    3. Chiappinelli, Olga & May, Nils, 2022. "Too good to be true? Time-inconsistent renewable energy policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    4. Marian Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller & Sebastian Stolorz, 2016. "Rigidity of Public Contracts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(3), pages 396-427, September.
    5. Hokkanen, Topi, 2023. "Externalities and market failures of cryptocurrencies," BoF Economics Review 4/2023, Bank of Finland.
    6. Marian W. Moszoro, 2018. "Tools and approaches in public contracting research," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics, chapter 10, pages 88-96, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2000. "Information et économie publique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 107-115.
    8. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2018. "Implications of Third Parties for Contract Design," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 5-16, March.
    9. Olga Chiappinelli & Karsten Neuhoff, 2020. "Time-Consistent Carbon Pricing: The Role of Carbon Contracts for Differences," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1859, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    10. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2019. "Political contestability and public contracting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 945-966, October.
    11. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2020. "Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    12. Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
    13. Olga Chiappinelli & Karsten Neuhoff, 2017. "Time-Consistent Carbon Pricing," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1710, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    14. Fabian Herweg & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2020. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2194-2212, May.
    15. Ranjani Krishnan & Deepa Mani, 2020. "Uncertainty and Compensation Design in Strategic Interfirm Contracts†," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 542-574, March.
    16. Klein, Michael, 1996. "Competition in network industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1591, The World Bank.
    17. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    18. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2009. "Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 160-170, September.
    19. MARINI, Marco, 1996. "Property Rights and Market : Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    20. Henrekson, Magnus & Johansson, Dan, 2010. "Firm Growth, Institutions and Structural Transformation," Ratio Working Papers 150, The Ratio Institute.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:igg:jhcitp:v:15:y:2024:i:1:p:1-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journal Editor (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.igi-global.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.