Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
A discrete public good is characterized by a threshold production function: the good is provided if a certain number of contributors is reached. The author considers a Bayesian framework where an individual's cost associated with his participation in the provision of a public good is private information. An efficient allocation mechanism is constructed when the outside option--available to individuals refusing to participate in the mechanism--is zero utility and also for uniform uncertainty when the outside option is either voluntary contribution or forced contribution. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Volume (Year): 35 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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