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The Brand is the Bundle Strategies for the Mobile Ecosystem

Author

Listed:
  • Dave HEATLEY

    (New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, Wellington)

  • Bronwyn HOWELL

    (New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, Wellington)

Abstract

The current mobile ecosystem is best understood in terms of a monopolistic competition model, characterised by heterogeneous producers providing a range of differentiated products for consumers with heterogeneous preferences. Product differentiation offers producers some market power, ultimately constrained by imperfect substitutes from rivals and the threat of market entry. To achieve their goals, consumers require a mixture of products from the network, handset and application domains. Reduced search and other transaction costs are a demand-side benefit of product bundling. Producers in this market have high fixed costs and low marginal costs. High fixed costs discourage entry, which increases the market power of producers. Low marginal costs and uncorrelated customer preferences across products for individual consumers encourage producers to expand their sales using supply-side bundling. Thus there are strong supply and demand side benefits from product bundling. We argue that producers will compete in terms of differentiated bundles combining network, handset and application features, with branding as the essential strategy for bundle differentiation. Successful business strategies will require direct access to customers and information about their specific preferences. For illustration, we look at the currently apparent strategies of Google, Apple and Nokia. The mobile ecosystem is complex but not unique. Strong parallels can be drawn between the mobile ecosystem and the television ecosystem. Google appears to be following a "free to air" strategy and Apple a "pay TV" strategy in bundle differentiation. Television manufacturers are largely undifferentiated and have little market power: this may be the fate of handset manufacturers and network operators who are comparatively powerless to withstand the evolutionary development of the mobile ecosystem.

Suggested Citation

  • Dave HEATLEY & Bronwyn HOWELL, 2009. "The Brand is the Bundle Strategies for the Mobile Ecosystem," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(75), pages 79-102, 3rd quart.
  • Handle: RePEc:idt:journl:cs7504
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Danny Quah, 2003. "Digital Goods and the New Economy," CEP Discussion Papers dp0563, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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    3. Howell, Bronwyn, 2006. "An Institutional Economics Analysis of Regulatory Institutions in the Telecommunications Sector," Working Paper Series 3832, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    4. Quah, Danny, 2003. "Digital goods and the new economy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2236, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, 2005. "Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 173-245.
    6. Tallberg, Mathias & Hämmäinen, Heikki & Töyli, Juuso & Kamppari, Sauli & Kivi, Antero, 0. "Impacts of handset bundling on mobile data usage: The case of Finland," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(10-11), pages 648-659, November.
    7. William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(3), pages 475-498.
    8. Barry Nalebuff, 2004. "Bundling as an Entry Barrier," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 159-187.
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    Cited by:

    1. Howell, Bronwyn E & Potgieter, Petrus H., 2017. "Competition and vertical/agglomeration effects in media mergers: bagging bundle benefits," 14th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Kyoto 2017: Mapping ICT into Transformation for the Next Information Society 168487, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Business ecosystem; platform; monopolistic competition; product bundling; heterogeneous demand; business strategies; mobile telephony; mobile applications; branding; price discrimination.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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