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Majority Voting – A Critique Preferential Decision-Making – An Alternative

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  • Peter Emerson

Abstract

The basis of western democracy is the almost universal belief that controversies shall be resolved by the will of a majority. And quite right too. Unfortunately, this leads many to take decisions by a majority vote, with proposed amendments and then the motion itself all approved or rejected in simple yes-or-no ballots. Other more accurate voting systems have long since been devised, and yet binary voting prevails, not only in democracies, but also in theocracies and autocracies; it is ubiquitous, in politics, business and law. Accordingly, this article analyses its weaknesses, discusses its origins, relates a little history, and refers to some of its worst consequences. It then goes on to describe a non-majoritarian methodology, to compare majority voting to other decision-making voting procedures, and finally to talk of a world where the words ‘majority’, ‘minority’ and ‘veto’ may fade from the political lexicon.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Emerson, 2024. "Majority Voting – A Critique Preferential Decision-Making – An Alternative," Journal of Politics and Law, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 17(1), pages 1-47, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:jpl123:v:17:y:2024:i:1:p:47
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607.
    2. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051.
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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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