IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v15y2023i3p2519-d1052250.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Promotion Incentive, Population Mobility and Public Service Expenditure

Author

Listed:
  • Jiali Yu

    (School of Economics & Management, Shanghai Polytechnic University, Shanghai 201209, China)

  • Mengfan Xia

    (School of Public of Administration, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China)

  • Shangguang Yang

    (Business School, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai 201418, China)

  • Jinyue Zhu

    (School of Economics & Management, Shanghai Polytechnic University, Shanghai 201209, China)

Abstract

Improving the level of public service expenditure is the basic condition to meet people’s growing yearning for a better life in a new era. This study aims to examine the influence of promotion incentive and population mobility on public service expenditure. With the panel data of 30 provinces (excluding Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) in China from 2010 to 2018, a fixed effect model was employed to conduct the empirical research first, and then analyze the heterogeneity of the impact. In addition, the robustness was examined by substituting core explanatory variables and explained variables and using the spatial econometric model. Results indicated that promotion incentive and population mobility had significant negative effects on public service expenditure (medical care, education, culture, sports and media, social security and employment). By replacing the explained variables and the core explanatory variables and using the spatial economic model, the research conclusion was still stable and reliable. In different regions, promotion incentive and population mobility had different effects on different types of public service expenditure. In addition, it was revealed that the improvement of the urbanization level, economic development level, population density, residents’ education level and the proportion of tertiary industry had a significant positive impact on public service expenditure. The findings in this study can provide useful references for policy makers to allocate public service expenditure.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiali Yu & Mengfan Xia & Shangguang Yang & Jinyue Zhu, 2023. "Promotion Incentive, Population Mobility and Public Service Expenditure," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-14, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:2519-:d:1052250
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/3/2519/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/3/2519/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    2. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    3. Georg-Benedikt Fischer & Berthold U. Wigger, 2016. "Fiscal Competition and Higher Education Spending in Germany," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(2), pages 234-252, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2019. "Politicians’ promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 63-94.
    2. Cao, Chunfang & Li, Xiaoyang & Xia, Changyuan, 2021. "The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    3. Chen, Zhiyuan & Li, Yong & Zhang, Jie, 2016. "The bank–firm relationship: Helping or grabbing?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 385-403.
    4. Tang, Peng & Feng, Yue & Li, Min & Zhang, Yanyan, 2021. "Can the performance evaluation change from central government suppress illegal land use in local governments? A new interpretation of Chinese decentralisation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    5. Zhang, Muyang & Zhou, Guangsu & Fan, Gang, 2020. "Political Control and Economic Inequality: Evidence from Chinese Cities," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    6. Jiajing Sun & Michael Cole & Zhiyuan Huang & Shouyang Wang, 2019. "Chinese leadership: Provincial perspectives on promotion and performance," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 37(4), pages 750-772, June.
    7. Haiwen Zhou, 2023. "State Capacity and Leadership: Why Did China Take off?," Chinese Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 50-68, January.
    8. Qichun He & Meng Sun, 2018. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Increase the Investment Rate? Evidence from Chinese Panel Data," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 75-101, May.
    9. Che, Jiahua & Chung, Kim-Sau & Lu, Yang K., 2017. "Decentralization and political career concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 201-210.
    10. Chen, Xiaodong & Mi, Haoming & Zhou, Peng, 2023. "Whether to decentralize and how to decentralize? The optimal fiscal federalism in an endogenous growth model," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2023/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    11. Xingheng Xie & Mengting Zhang & Changbiao Zhong, 2022. "Temporal and Spatial Variations in China’s Government-Official-Appointment System and Local Water-Environment Pollution," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-17, July.
    12. Mengting Ruan & Xiaolu Zhao, 2022. "Fiscal Pressure, Policy Choices and Regional Economic Disparity: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-13, September.
    13. Liangliang Liu & Yonghao Guan, 2023. "How do fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal transfers affect energy consumption in China?," Energy & Environment, , vol. 34(5), pages 1228-1242, August.
    14. An, Heng & Chen, Yanyan & Luo, Danglun & Zhang, Ting, 2016. "Political uncertainty and corporate investment: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 174-189.
    15. Lu Ming & Zhao Chen & Yongqin Wang & Yan Zhang & Yuan Zhang & Changyuan Luo, 2013. "China’s Economic Development," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14502.
    16. Shailer, Greg & Wang, Kun, 2015. "Government ownership and the cost of debt for Chinese listed corporations," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 1-17.
    17. Caldeira, Emilie, 2012. "Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 878-897.
    18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/50oojv2kpq972a1928dqj0v6at is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Petra Persson & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2016. "The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 338-374.
    20. repec:zbw:bofitp:2019_004 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Sergei Guriev, 2019. "Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 120-146, March.
    22. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:2519-:d:1052250. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.