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A Location-Based Crowdsensing Incentive Mechanism Based on Ensemble Learning and Prospect Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Jiaqi Liu

    (School of Computer Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Hucheng Xu

    (School of Computer Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Xiaoheng Deng

    (School of Electronic Information, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Hui Liu

    (Computer Science Department, Missouri State University, Springfield, MO 65897, USA)

  • Deng Li

    (School of Electronic Information, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

Abstract

Crowdsensing uses the participants’ smart devices to form a new perception network. The coverage of crowdsensing’s tasks determines the quality of services. Under the constraint of budget and the number of participants, the platform needs to increase the participation duration of participants through incentive mechanisms to increase the coverage of tasks. There are two problems with the existing incentive mechanisms: (1) many incentives ignore the participants’ characteristics, and using a single incentive mechanism for different participants will make the incentive effect not reach the expectation; (2) many incentives will affect the effectiveness because of the decision problem caused by asymmetric information. Inspired by ensemble learning and prospect theory, this paper proposes the Incentive Mechanism based on Ensemble Learning and Prospect Theory (IMELPT). First, we propose the Deep-Stacking-Generation algorithm based on Dropout (DSGD), to predict the participants and distinguish whether they are long-term or short-term participants. If the participants are short-term, we incentivize them through the Short-term Participant Incentive Mechanism based on Prospect Theory (SPIMPT). We increase the participation duration by transforming the change in reward into asymmetric information that aligns the participant’s goal with the platform. If the participants are long-term participants, we motivate them through the Long-term Participant Incentive Mechanism (LPIM), to maintain the participation rate of participants by maximizing their utility. Theoretical analysis and experiments on real datasets demonstrated that IMELPT can reliably improve the coverage of crowdsensing tasks.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiaqi Liu & Hucheng Xu & Xiaoheng Deng & Hui Liu & Deng Li, 2023. "A Location-Based Crowdsensing Incentive Mechanism Based on Ensemble Learning and Prospect Theory," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(16), pages 1-30, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:11:y:2023:i:16:p:3590-:d:1220501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Xiaoyu Qu & Xiao Wang & Xutian Qin, 2023. "Research on Responsible Innovation Mechanism Based on Prospect Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Yu Liu & Dong Cai & Chunxiang Guo & Haizhen Huang, 2020. "Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory," Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Hindawi, vol. 2020, pages 1-10, November.
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