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A Little Too Little, A Little Too Late: The Political Impact of Russia’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement

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  • Marina Zaloznaya

    (College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA)

  • William M. Reisinger

    (College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA)

Abstract

Similarly to “wars” on drugs and terrorism, the fight against corruption has recently emerged as an attractive political tool. From Argentina and India to the United States and the Philippines, anti-corruption rhetoric has been successfully utilized by political outsiders to challenge establishment candidates. It remains less clear, however, whether anti-corruption enforcement allows incumbent politicians to hold on to power. In this article, we use a comparative subnational design to analyze the impact of corruption prosecutions on electoral support for the president of Russia. By combining original survey data on popular political attitudes and behaviors as well as citizens’ own participation in petty corruption with official statistics on corruption prosecutions, on the one hand, and data on media coverage of regional corruption scandals, on the other, we reveal a small negative effect of anti-corruptionism on voting for Putin. Our data allow us to adjudicate among several theoretical mechanisms that may lead to this effect. We find that, although ordinary Russians dislike corruption and expect the federal government to fight it, Putin’s anti-corruption enforcement has failed to convince the population that he is the right man for the job. Some Russians, we argue, take the Kremlin’s prosecutions as an indicator of the regime’s failure to prevent corruption among its agents, while others resent the administration for trying to score political points through hyped-up and punitive anti-corruptionism.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Zaloznaya & William M. Reisinger, 2025. "A Little Too Little, A Little Too Late: The Political Impact of Russia’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement," Laws, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-19, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlawss:v:14:y:2025:i:2:p:20-:d:1617097
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sidorkin, Oleg & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2018. "Political cycles and corruption in Russian regions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 55-74.
    2. Cameron Ross, 2011. "Regional Elections and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(4), pages 641-661.
    3. Daniel Treisman, 2011. "Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 590-609, July.
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