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An Investigation into the Mechanism of Government Embedment and Organizational Environment Influencing Farmers’ Credible Commitment in Regard to the Collective Governance of Rural Residential Land

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  • Zhongjian Yang

    (School of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu 611130, China)

  • Hong Tang

    (School of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu 611130, China)

  • Jiafang Jin

    (School of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu 611130, China)

  • Ruiping Ran

    (School of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu 611130, China)

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of Government Embedment and Organizational Environment on farmers’ Credible Commitment in regard to the Collective Governance of Rural Residential Land and to inform decision-making processes that promote farmers’ compliance with Rural Residential Land management regulations and enhance the effectiveness of the Collective Governance of Rural Residential Land. The research employs various models, including Oprobit, Ologit, IV-2SLS, and moderated mediation. The research results show that (1) both Government Embedment and the Cultural Environment within the Organizational Context significantly enhance Farmers’ Credible Commitment in regard to the Collective Governance of Rural Residential Land. Notably, the quality of the Cultural Environment, when improved by Government Embedment, boosts this commitment further. (2) Endogeneity issues can lead to an overestimation of the effects of these factors. (3) Punishment intensity only positively moderates the impact of the Cultural Environment on Farmers’ Credible Commitment. (4) The moderating effect of punishment intensity correlates positively with its strength, exhibiting a threshold value. In conclusion, our research underscores the need to establish a robust regulatory framework for Rural Residential Land use, foster a conducive village cultural atmosphere, and consistently enhance the punishment intensity for illegal Rural Residential Land use. These measures will encourage farmers to adhere to Credible Commitment in regard to Rural Residential Land use, thereby facilitating the effective implementation of Collective Governance over Rural Residential Land.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhongjian Yang & Hong Tang & Jiafang Jin & Ruiping Ran, 2024. "An Investigation into the Mechanism of Government Embedment and Organizational Environment Influencing Farmers’ Credible Commitment in Regard to the Collective Governance of Rural Residential Land," Land, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-18, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlands:v:13:y:2024:i:9:p:1520-:d:1481036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
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