Does Managerial Power Explain the Association between Agency Costs and Firm Value? The French Case

This paper demonstrates whether the impact of agency costs on firm value depends on the level of managerial power using the fraction of capital held by the manager, as well as their level of voting rights. Focusing on a sample of 120 non-financial French firms incorporated in the CAC All-Tradable Index for the period 2008–2022, the first empirical analysis provides strong evidence that agency costs of equity, as measured in terms of operating expenses, administrative expenses and the agency cost of free cash flow, exert a negative impact on the firm’s market value. In a second empirical analysis, we split our sample into three sub-samples with the aim of capturing the effect of managerial power. The findings lead us to believe that the association between the agency cost measurement and the firm’s market value depend on the level of managerial power. This paper challenges prior studies by strengthening our understanding of managerial behavior (incentive, neutral, and entrenchment) in relation to shareholder wealth. Furthermore, it contributes to the recent literature by enabling a better knowledge of the disparity related to studies conducted in other countries with different governance models.