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Tripartite Data Analysis for Optimizing Telemedicine Operations: Evidence from Guizhou Province in China

Author

Listed:
  • Jinna Yu

    (Business School, Guizhou Minzu University, Guiyang 550025, China)

  • Tingting Zhang

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China)

  • Zhen Liu

    (School of Business, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China)

  • Assem Abu Hatab

    (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, P.O. Box 7013, SE-750 07 Uppsala, Sweden
    Department of Economics & Rural Development, Arish University, Al-Arish 45511, North Sinai, Egypt)

  • Jing Lan

    (College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China)

Abstract

Telemedicine is an innovative approach that helps alleviate the health disparity in developing countries and improve health service accessibility, affordability, and quality. Few studies have focused on the social and organizational issues involved in telemedicine, despite in-depth studies of and significant improvements in these technologies. This paper used evolutionary game theory to analyze behavioral strategies and their dynamic evolution in the implementation and operation of telemedicine. Further, numerical simulation was carried out to develop management strategies for promoting telemedicine as a new way of delivering health services. The results showed that: (1) When the benefits are greater than the costs, the higher medical institutions (HMIs), primary medical institutions (PMIs), and patients positively promote telemedicine with benign interactions; (2) when the costs are greater than the benefits, the stability strategy of HMIs, PMIs, and patients is, respectively, ‘no efforts’, ‘no efforts’, and ‘non-acceptance’; and (3) promotion of telemedicine is influenced by the initial probability of the ‘HMI efforts’, ‘PMI efforts’, and ‘patients’ acceptance’ strategy chosen by the three stakeholders, telemedicine costs, and the reimbursement ratio of such costs. Based on theoretical analysis, in order to verify the theoretical model, this paper introduces the case study of a telemedicine system integrated with health resources at provincial, municipal, county, and township level in Guizhou. The findings of the case study were consistent with the theoretical analysis. Therefore, the central Chinese government and local governments should pay attention to the running cost of MIs and provide financial support when the costs are greater than the benefits. At the same time, the government should raise awareness of telemedicine and increase participation by all three stakeholders. Lastly, in order to promote telemedicine effectively, it is recommended that telemedicine services are incorporated within the scope of medical insurance and the optimal reimbursement ratio is used.

Suggested Citation

  • Jinna Yu & Tingting Zhang & Zhen Liu & Assem Abu Hatab & Jing Lan, 2020. "Tripartite Data Analysis for Optimizing Telemedicine Operations: Evidence from Guizhou Province in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(1), pages 1-23, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:17:y:2020:i:1:p:375-:d:305773
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
    2. Catherine Henderson & Martin Knapp & José-Luis Fernández & Jennifer Beecham & Shashivadan P Hirani & Martin Cartwright & Lorna Rixon & Michelle Beynon & Anne Rogers & Peter Bower & Helen Doll & Ray Fi, 2013. "Cost effectiveness of telehealth for patients with long term conditions (Whole Systems Demonstrator telehealth questionnaire study): nested economic evaluation in a pragmatic, cluster randomised contr," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56772, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrizio Striani & Claudio Rocco, 2022. "Analisi sistematica di servizi di telemedicina a supporto della morbilità: tecnologie e prospettive," MECOSAN, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2022(121), pages 63-90.
    2. Wanchun Xu & Zijing Pan & Shan Lu & Liang Zhang, 2020. "Regional Heterogeneity of Application and Effect of Telemedicine in the Primary Care Centres in Rural China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(12), pages 1-15, June.

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