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Simulating the Impact of Crossover Kidney Transplantation on the Nord Italia Transplant Program

Author

Listed:
  • Monica Salvioli

    (Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia e dell’Emilia Romagna, 25124 Brescia, Italy)

  • Roberto Lucchetti

    (Department of Mathematics, Politecnico di Milano, 20133 Milano, Italy)

  • Rosanna Torelli

    (Organ and Tissue Transplantation Immunology, Fondazione IRCCS Ca’ Granda Ospedale Maggiore Policlinico di Milano, 20122 Milano, Italy)

Abstract

The increasing number of patients affected by chronic kidney disease makes it necessary to rely on living donors. However, a patient often cannot exploit her potential donor, due to blood or tissue incompatibility. Therefore, crossover transplantation programs have been developed in several countriesin order to increase the number of people receiving a kidney from a living donor. After reviewing the essential medical facts needed for the subsequent results, we quickly introduce two known algorithms for crossover transplantation. Next, we consider a dataset provided by the Nord Italia Transplant program, and we apply the above algorithms in order to highlight the benefits of these efficient procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • Monica Salvioli & Roberto Lucchetti & Rosanna Torelli, 2016. "Simulating the Impact of Crossover Kidney Transplantation on the Nord Italia Transplant Program," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-9, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2016:i:4:p:30-:d:80965
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zenios, Stefanos & Woodle, E. Steve & Ross, Lainie Friedman, 2001. "Primum Non Nocere: Avoiding Harm to Vulnerable Wait List Candidates in an Indirect Kidney Exchange," Research Papers 1684, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    3. Anderson, Ross & Ashlagi, Itai & Gamarnik, David & Roth, Alvin E., 2015. "Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem," Scholarly Articles 30830063, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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