IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedhep/y2003iqip48-58nv.27no.1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bankruptcy law and large complex financial organizations: a primer

Author

Listed:
  • Robert R. Bliss

Abstract

Large complex financial organization (LCFOs) are exposed to multiple problems when they become insolvent. They operate in countries with different approaches to bankruptcy and, within the U.S., multiple insolvency administrators. The special financial instruments that comprise a substantial portion of LCFO assets are exempted from the usual "time out" that permits the orderly resolution of creditor claims. This situation is complicated by the opacity of LCFIs' positions, which may make them difficult to sell or unwind in times of financial crisis. This article discusses these issues and their origins.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert R. Bliss, 2003. "Bankruptcy law and large complex financial organizations: a primer," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q I, pages 48-58.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2003:i:qi:p:48-58:n:v.27no.1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2003/1qeppart4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Armour, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A Review," Working Papers wp197, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    2. Furfine, Craig H, 2003. " Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(1), pages 111-128, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wall, Larry D. & Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Frame, W. Scott, 2005. "Resolving large financial intermediaries: Banks versus housing enterprises," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 386-425, April.
    2. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2004. "Agency problems and goal conflicts," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. Iori, Giulia & Jafarey, Saqib & Padilla, Francisco G., 2006. "Systemic risk on the interbank market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 525-542, December.
    4. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, 2006. "U.S. corporate and bank insolvency regimes: an economic comparison and evaluation," Working Paper Series WP-06-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    5. William J. Bergman & Robert R. Bliss & Christian A. Johnson & George G. Kaufman, 2004. "Netting, financial contracts, and banks: the economic implications," Working Paper Series WP-04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    6. Brierley, Peter, 2009. "Financial Stability Paper No 5: The UK Special Resolution Regime for Failing Banks in an International Context," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 5, Bank of England.
    7. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
    8. Robert R. Bliss, 2003. "Resolution of large complex financial organizations," Working Paper Series WP-03-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy ; Financial institutions;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2003:i:qi:p:48-58:n:v.27no.1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernie Flores). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbchus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.