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The aggregate effects of advance notice requirements

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  • Marcelo Veracierto

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of advance notice requirements on aggregate output, wages, employment, and welfare levels. The author finds that, contrary to firing taxes, advance notice requirements do not lead to reduction in employment. However, they can reduce welfare levels considerably more than firing taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo Veracierto, 2002. "The aggregate effects of advance notice requirements," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 26(Q I), pages 19-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2002:i:qi:p:19-31:n:v.26no.1
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    1. Samuel Bentolila & Giuseppe Bertola, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402.
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