The role of relative performance in bank closure decisions
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- Kenneth Kasa & Mark M. Spiegel, 1999. "The role of relative performance in bank closure decisions," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 99-07, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Acharya, Viral V & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2005. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 5154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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KeywordsBank failures ; Problem banks;
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