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International debt with unenforceable claims

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  • Jurg Niehans

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  • Jurg Niehans, 1985. "International debt with unenforceable claims," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Win, pages 64-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfer:y:1985:i:win:p:64-79
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey Sachs & Daniel Cohen, 1982. "LDC Borrowing with Default Risk," NBER Working Papers 0925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Paul De Grauwe & Michele Fratianni, 1984. "The Political Economy of International Lending," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 4(1), pages 147-184, Spring/Su.
    3. Van Horne, James C, 1976. "Optimal Initiation of Bankruptcy Proceedings by Debt Holders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(3), pages 897-910, June.
    4. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dreher, Axel & Vaubel, Roland, 2000. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard and political business cycles? : Evidence from panel data," Discussion Papers 598, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
    2. Evrensel, Ayse Y. & Kim, Jong Sung, 2006. "Macroeconomic policies and participation in IMF programs," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 264-281, October.
    3. Rudiger Dornbusch & Thomas S. Johnson & Anne O. Krueger, 1988. "Our LDC Debts," NBER Chapters, in: The United States in the World Economy, pages 161-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2004. "Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January.
    5. Dreher, Axel & Walter, Stefanie, 2010. "Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF Programs on the Likelihood and Outcome of Currency Crises," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
    6. Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, 1989. "How Sovereign Debt Has Worked," NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, pages 225-236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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