Intermediation and vertical integration
This paper views financial intermediaries as vertically integrated firms. The authors explore how competitive conditions in retail and wholesale funding markets affect the incentive for (upstream) originators and (downstream) fund managers to integrate. The underlying tradeoff in our model is driven by the choice between the production of an illiquid but high yielding loan and a liquid but relatively low yielding bond. The authors find that greater homogeneity among savers has two effects, both of which tend to increase the incentive to form integrated intermediaries. Greater homogeneity both increases competition between independent fund managers and reduces the likelihood of inefficient underinvestment by integrated intermediaries. The authors also find that the incentive to integrate is greater when fund managers have more power in the market for firms' securities.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): (1998)
Issue (Month): Aug ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1455 East 6th St., Cleveland OH 44114|
Web page: http://www.clevelandfed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marie-Odile Yanelle, 1997. "Banking Competition and Market Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 215-239.
- Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October.
- Thakor, Anjan V., 2000. "Relationship Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 3-5, January.
- Tim S. Campbell, 1987. "The valuation cost approach to the theory of financial intermediation," Proceedings 169, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1995. "Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 557-575.
- David Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Relationship Banking, Deposit Insurance and Bank Portfolio Choice," Finance 0411046, EconWPA.
- Stahl, Dale O, II, 1988. "Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 189-201, March.
- Thakor, Anjan V., 1996. "The design of financial systems: An overview," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 917-948, June.
- Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1991.
"Credible commitments, contract enforcement problems and banks: Intermediation as credibility assurance,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 605-632, June.
- Boot, A.W.A. & Thakor, A.V. & Udell, G.F., 1987. "Credible commitments, contract enforcement problems and banks : Intermediation as credibility assurance," Research Memorandum 6168c386-7508-4320-afbb-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Udell, Gregory F., 1989. "Loan quality, commercial loan review and loan officer contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 367-382, July.
- Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 184-216, April.
- Winton Andrew, 1995. "Delegated Monitoring and Bank Structure in a Finite Economy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 158-187, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcpr:y:1998:i:aug:p:500-523. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (4D Library)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.