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Umbrella supervision and the role of the central bank

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph G. Haubrich
  • James B. Thomson

Abstract

Deregulation and financial consolidation have led to the development of financial holding companiesallowing commercial banking, insurance, investment banking, and other financial activities to be conducted under the same corporate umbrellaand the Federal Reserve has been named supervisor of the consolidated enterprise. This Policy Discussion Paper will show that there likely are economies of scope between the Feds inherent central-banking responsibilities and those of an umbrella supervisor and that these duel roles benefit both the Fed and functional regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph G. Haubrich & James B. Thomson, 2005. "Umbrella supervision and the role of the central bank," Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Dec.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcpd:y:2005:i:dec:n:11
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
    2. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1990. "Financial Fragility and Economic Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 87-114.
    3. Ergungor, O. Emre, 2004. "Market- vs. bank-based financial systems: Do rights and regulations really matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(12), pages 2869-2887, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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