IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedcpd/y2005idecn11.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Umbrella supervision and the role of the central bank

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph G. Haubrich
  • James B. Thomson

Abstract

Deregulation and financial consolidation have led to the development of financial holding companies—allowing commercial banking, insurance, investment banking, and other financial activities to be conducted under the same corporate umbrella—and the Federal Reserve has been named supervisor of the consolidated enterprise. This Policy Discussion Paper will show that there likely are economies of scope between the Fed’s inherent central-banking responsibilities and those of an umbrella supervisor and that these duel roles benefit both the Fed and functional regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph G. Haubrich & James B. Thomson, 2005. "Umbrella supervision and the role of the central bank," Policy Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Dec.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcpd:y:2005:i:dec:n:11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/PolicyDis/PDPNo11.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?item_id=495644&filepath=/docs/historical/frbclev/pdp/frbclv_pdp_200512_011.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
    2. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1990. "Financial Fragility and Economic Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 87-114.
    3. Ergungor, O. Emre, 2004. "Market- vs. bank-based financial systems: Do rights and regulations really matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(12), pages 2869-2887, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank supervision ; Federal Reserve System;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcpd:y:2005:i:dec:n:11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (4D Library). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbclus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.