Efficiency of Non-cooperative Emission Taxes in Perfectly Competitive Markets
With the current efforts to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases and other cross border pollutants, the question of environmental federalism is as important as ever. By generalising the model presented by Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988), we show that the well established result within environmental federalism, that the government of a small country has no incentive to depart from the cooperative choice of environmental standards, does not hold for pollutants that have regional or global characteristics, as e.g. sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide has.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985.
"Export subsidies and international market share rivalry,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Greaker, Mads, 2003. "Strategic environmental policy when the governments are threatened by relocation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 141-154, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:23:y:2010:i:2:p:88-93. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Secretary)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.