IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/epc/journl/v11y2016i1p5-11.html

A rationalist explanation of Russian risk-taking

Author

Listed:
  • Frank Lehrbass

    (FOM University of Applied Sciences in Düsseldorf, Germany)

  • Valentin Weinhold

    (University of Düsseldorf, Germany)

Abstract

Three seemingly unrelated topics of Russian politics are investigated. It is shown that under expected utility maximization the assumptions of an unbiased oil forward market and a risk-acceptant attitude (strictly convex utility function) are sufficient to explain Russia’s open position in oil and the bailout of Rosneft. The risk-acceptant attitude of the Russian leader also causes a shrunken bargaining range for the conflict in Ukraine, which can be enlarged by sanctions but not necessarily by the proliferation of weapons. This gives sanctions a clear edge over the proliferation of weapons.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Lehrbass & Valentin Weinhold, 2016. "A rationalist explanation of Russian risk-taking," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 5-11, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:epc:journl:v:11:y:2016:i:1:p:5-11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/index.php/EPSJ/article/view/231
    Download Restriction: Open access 24 months after original publication.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Theorizing about conflict," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 165-189, Elsevier.
    2. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2010. "The Roles of Freedom, Growth, and Religion in the Taste for Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 329-358, May.
    2. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
    3. Christophe Muller & Pierre Pecher, 2021. "Terrorism, Insurgency, State Repression, and Cycles of Violence," Working Papers halshs-03134347, HAL.
    4. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676.
    5. Serhan Cevik & Mohammad Rahmati, 2015. "Breaking the Curse of Sisyphus: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Conflict Economic Transitions," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 57(4), pages 569-597, December.
    6. Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Technologies of Conflict," Working Papers 101111, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    7. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Side-payments and the costs of conflict," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 278-286.
    8. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2007. "Money, religion and revolution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, January.
    9. Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2006. "Military expenditure, threats, and growth," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 129-155.
    10. Jean-François, MAYSTADT, 2007. "Does inequality make us rebel ? A renewed theoretical model applied to South Mexico," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007041, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    11. Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2012. "Technology of military conflict, military spending, and war," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 226-236.
    12. Mr. Daniel C Hardy, 2013. "Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance," IMF Working Papers 2013/172, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    14. Héctor Galindo Silva, 2007. "Polarización económica y emergencia de confilctos violentos internos un estudio empírico," Documentos de Economía 4449, Universidad Javeriana - Bogotá.
    15. Fanny Coulomb & Jacques Fontanel, 2003. "Disarmament: A century of economic thought," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 193-208.
    16. Kyung Hwan Baik & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2020. "The effects of conflict budget on the intensity of conflict: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 240-258, March.
    17. Martin Ottmann, 2020. "Peace for our time? Examining the effect of power-sharing on postwar rebellions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(5), pages 617-631, September.
    18. Charles Anderton, 2003. "Economic theorizing of conflict: Historical contributions, future possibilities," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 209-222.
    19. Mauricio González-Forero & Timm Faulwasser & Laurent Lehmann, 2017. "A model for brain life history evolution," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(3), pages 1-28, March.
    20. Jean-François Maystadt, 2008. "Does inequality make us rebel? A revisited theoretical model applied to South Mexico," HiCN Working Papers 41, Households in Conflict Network.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:epc:journl:v:11:y:2016:i:1:p:5-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael Brown, Managing Editor, EPSJ (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecaarea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.